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Abstract
We analyze foreign equity caps for international joint ventures. We develop a partial
equilibrium model in which foreign equity caps are determined endogenously and find an
interesting property, named a welfare indifference property; i.e., maximization of domestic
welfare and that of world welfare are indifferent for the host government. This property also
implies that the government is indifferent to the distribution of a JV's profit.
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International joint ventures (IJVs) have been observed in industries with im-
perfectly competitive markets. For these IJVs, some less developed countries
have enforced foreign equity caps, which sets a ceiling on the ownership share
of foreign ﬁrms. For instance, Thailand limits foreign ownership share to less
than 50% for IJVs in 43 industries (JETRO, 2002).
In spite of such observations, there are few papers dealing with foreign
equity caps for IJVs.1 In this paper we develop a simple partial equilibrium
framework in which foreign equity caps are determined endogenously and
ﬁnd an interesting property where a host government uses the foreign equity
cap as an instrument to determine the optimal market structure. The host
government ﬁrst determines the foreign equity cap level, and then ﬁrms de-
termine whether they set up a joint venture (JV). If they agree to set up a
JV, their ownership shares are obtained through Nash bargaining. Similar to
Abe and Zhao (2002), we assume that if ﬁrms disagree, they will compete in
the market in a Cournot fashion. In this setting, we show that given model
parameters, two possible equilibria exist. One of these provides a foreign
equity cap that practically prohibits IJVs, while the other allows ﬁrms to
set up IJVs. Furthermore, we show the welfare indiﬀerence property, i.e.,
maximization of domestic welfare and that of world welfare are indiﬀerent
for the host government. The optimal foreign equity cap level is thus same
in the both maximization problems. This property also implies that the
government is indiﬀerent to the distribution of a JV’s proﬁt.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
basic model. Section 3 solves the game, obtains the equilibrium foreign equity
caps, and explains the welfare indiﬀerence property. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider two countries; a less developed country and a developed country.
Since this paper focuses on the policy implemented by the government in the
less developed country, we label the former country h (home or host country),
and the latter country f (foreign country). Each country has a ﬁrm, ﬁrms
h and f, respectively, that produces homegeneous products. The product
market is located in country h. The inverse demand function for the market
1Svejner and Smith (1984) consider foreign equity caps for IJVs in an industry with
vertical production and show that the policy may be ineﬀective because of transfer pricing.
Das and Katayama (2003) show that foreign equity caps reduce welfare in the host country
under imcomplete information. The focus of these papers is quite diﬀerent from ours.
1is given by
P = P(X) with P
  < 0, (1)
where P and X are price and total quantity of the product, respectively.
There are two possible equilibrium market structure. In the ﬁrst, the
ﬁrms set up a JV (JV monopoly) and X = XJV, where XJV is the out-
put produced by the JV. In the second, they compete in a Cournot fashion
(Cournot duopoly) and X = xh+xf, where xi is the output produced by ﬁrm
i (i = h,f). In the latter case, ﬁrm f incurs a trade cost while exporting.
In setting up the JV, ﬁrms determine their ownership shares through
Nash bargaining. Let β ∈ [0,1) be the ownership possessed by ﬁrm f.2 The
host government can regulate ﬁrm f’s ownership share using a foreign equity
cap, δ ∈ [0,1).3
We consider a three-stage game, where in the ﬁrst stage, the government
in country h sets a foreign equity cap level, δ. In the second stage, given
the foreign equity cap, ﬁrms h and f decide whether to set up a JV and
determine their ownership shares or to compete in the market as distinct
ﬁrms. In the third stage, given the market structure (i.e., JV monopoly or
Cournot duopoly), ﬁrms produce and supply the products.
Production uses labor and ﬁrms have diﬀerent technologies. The cost
functions for ﬁrm h and f are provided as follows:
Ch = C(xh;γh,w h) (2)
Cf = C(xf;γf,w f,τ), (3)
where γi is a technology paramater, wi is a wage level, and τ is trade cost
(i = h,f). Assume that these cost functions (2) and (3) satisfy the following
relationships; C(0) = 0, C  > 0, C   ≥ 0, ∂Ci/∂αi > 0, ∀αi = γi,w i (i =
h,f), and ∂Cf/∂τ > 0. In this paper, a smaller γ corresponds to a higher
techonlogy. Assume that the ﬁrm in the developed country (ﬁrm f) has
superior technology; i.e., γh >γ f, and that the wage in the less developed
country is lower; i.e., wh <w f. When a JV is set up, it can exploit ﬁrm
f’s superior technology and country h’s lower wage. Therefore, the JV’s cost
function is given by4
CJV = C(X;γf,w h). (4)
2In our model, we exclude the possibility that other investors possess ownership rights
in the JV.
3Note that if β, which is determined through Nash bargaining, is greater than δ, β is
regulated, while if β is smaller than or equal to δ, it is allowed, because a foreign equity
cap permits a smaller foreign ownership level than the requirement.
4Note that X = XJV because the JV is a monopolist.
2Since the JV has a better production environment, the JV’s marginal cost is
lower than each ﬁrm’s; i.e., ∂Ci/∂xi >∂ C JV/∂X, ∀i = h,f.
3 Foreign Equity Caps
We now solve the game using backward induction. In the third stage, we
have two market structures; (i) Cournot duopoly; and (ii) JV monopoly. We
ﬁnd the respective equilibrium for each market structure.
First, consider the case of Cournot duopoly. From equations (1), (2) and
(3), the proﬁt functions are
πh = P(X)xh − Ch, (5)
πf = P(X)xf − Cf, (6)
where πi (i = h,f) is ﬁrm i’s proﬁt. The ﬁrst order conditions for equations











The second order condition is assumed to be satisﬁed.5 From equations (5’)
and (6’), we obtain Cournot outputs xh and xf, and substituting them back
into equations (5) and (6), and ﬁnd the proﬁts πh and πf under Cournot
duopoly.
Next, consider the JV monopoly. From equations (1) and (4), the JV’s
proﬁt is given by
Π=P(X)X − CJV. (7)






which determines the equilibrium output under JV monopoly, X. Then, we
ﬁnd JV’s equilibrium proﬁt, Π.
5We assume the inverse demand function (1) is not too convex for the second order
condition to be satisﬁed. This condition guarantees the stability and uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium.




{βΠ − πf}{(1 − β)Π − πh} (8)
s.t. βΠ ≥ πf (9)
(1 − β)Π ≥ πh (10)
δ ≥ β. (11)
Constraints (9) and (10) require that proﬁt distributed to ﬁrm i from the JV
be greater than ﬁrm i’s proﬁt under Cournot duopoly (i = h,f). That is,
these are participation constraints. From equations (9) and (10), we obtain




(for ﬁrm f) and β ≡
πh
Π
(for ﬁrm h). (12)








For both ﬁrms to agree to participate in the JV, ˜ β must be in the interval
(β,β). Note that this condition is equivalent to Π >π h + πf. Recall that δ
is determined by the host government in the ﬁrst stage. Depending on the
level of δ, we have three cases for the equilbrium ownership share β∗.
Lemma 1
(i)If δ ≥ ˜ β, a JV is set up and the equilibrium ownership share is β∗ = ˜ β.
(ii) If δ ∈ [β, ˜ β), a JV is set up and the equilibrium ownership share is β∗ = δ.
(iii) If δ<β , a JV is not set up and Cournot duopoly is realized.
Proof. Suppose that δ>˜ β. Then, constraint (11) is not binding. The equi-
librium ownership share is β∗ = ˜ β. Next, suppose that δ ∈ [β, ˜ β). Constraint
(11) is then binding and the equilibrium ownership share is β∗ = δ. Finally,
if δ<β , constraint (9) is not satisﬁed and Cournot duopoly is thus realized.
No equilibrium ownership share β∗ exists. 
In the ﬁrst stage, the government in country h determines the foreign
equity cap level δ in order to maximize domestic welfare. For the market
6For simplicity, we assume that both ﬁrms have equal bargaining power.
4structure j = CD (Cournot duopoly), JV (JV monopoly), welfare in country
h is given by
W
CD = CS
CD + πh, (14a)
W
JV = CS
JV +( 1− β)Π, (14b)
where CSj =
 X∗
0 P(X)dX − P(X∗)X∗ is the consumer surplus in country
h, and X∗ is the equilibrium output (j = CD,JV). Note that the consumer
surplus is independent of ownership share β for any market structure. From
Lemma 1, market structures depend on the value of δ. Thus, equations (14a)
and (14b) are rewritten as
W
CD = CS
CD + πh if δ ∈ [0,β) (15a)
W
JV = CS
JV +( 1− δ)Π if δ ∈ [β, ˜ β] (15b)
W
JV = CS
JV +( 1− ˜ β)Π otherwise. (15c)
Only equation (15b) is a decreasing function of δ. From (15a) - (15c), we
ﬁnd that the welfare function W is not continuous at δ = β and continuous
at δ = ˜ β (see Figure 1 and 2). We then have two possible solutions for
the equilibrium foreign equity cap level δ∗.I f W JV(δ = β) >W CD, the
government sets δ∗ = β to maximize domestic welfare (see Figure 1). On the
other hand, if W JV(δ = β) <W CD, the government chooses δ∗ ∈ [0,β) and
eliminates the possibility of a JV being set up (see Figure 2).
Proposition 1
If W JV(δ = β) <W CD, a host government chooses δ∗ ∈ [0,β) and the market
structure is a Cournot duopoly. If W JV(δ = β) >W CD, the government
chooses δ∗ = β, and the market structure is JV monopoly.
Choosing δ∗ ∈ [0,β) is in eﬀect the same as prohibiting IJVs. Then, in
the former case, a host government maximizes domestic welfare by fostering
competition in the market. In contrast, δ∗ = β is a threshold ownership
share for ﬁrm f to set up a JV (see equation (12)). Thus, in the latter case,
the government allows ﬁrms to set up a JV and provides the domestic ﬁrm
with the maximum ownership share.
Proposition 1 provides a condition that separates the two equilibrium
market structures implying that a foreign equity cap is an instrument the
government can use to inﬂuence market structure (JV monopoly or Cournot
duopoly). Suppose the host government chooses δ∗ = β. Substituting equa-




JV +( 1− β)Π = CS
JV +Π− πf. (16)
5Next, supposing that the government chooses δ∗ ∈ [0,β), welfare is then
obtained by equation (15a). The host government chooses Cournot duopoly
(resp. JV monopoly) if W CD is greater (resp. smaller) than W JV. Substi-
tuting (15a) and (16) into this condition and rearranging, we ﬁnd that the
condition for the government to choose Cournot duopoly is equivalent to7
CS
CD + πh + πf >C S
JV +Π . (17)
The left hand side and right hand side of equation (17) are world welfare
under Cournot duopoly and JV monopoly, respectively.
Proposition 2
A host government chooses a foreign equity cap level δ∗ ∈ [0,β) (resp. δ∗ = β)
if world welfare under Cournot duopoly is greater (resp. smaller) than that
under JV monopoly.
Proposition 2 is a little bit surprising. As shown in equations (14a) and
(14b), the host government concerned with domestic welfare, not ﬁrm f’s
proﬁt. Equation (17) shows, however, that the government prohibits to a
JV if world welfare under Cournot duopoly, which includes ﬁrm f’s proﬁt, is
greater than that under JV monopoly. Otherwise, the government chooses
a foreign equity cap level equal to the threshold ownership share for ﬁrm
f.8 This result illustrates a welfare indiﬀerece property, which means that
maximization of domestic welfare and that of world welfare are indiﬀerent for
the host government. Katrak (1983) considers perfectly competitive markets
and a given exogenous market structure, and shows that a foreign equity
cap leads to a reduction of foreign ownership share, which corresponds to
an increase in national welfare. The distribution of a JV’s proﬁt is thus
crucial for national welfare. In contrast, our model focuses on an imperfectly
competitive market and the host government’s optimal policy corresponds to
that of determining the optimal market structure. Then, the distribution of
a JV proﬁt is no longer crucial. Therefore, enforcing a foreign equity cap, the
host government considers world welfare level rather than the distribution of
a JV’s proﬁt, even if its aim is to maximize domestic welfare.
7Since the JV has a better production environment (see equations (2), (3), and (4)),
marginal cost under JV is smaller than that under Cournot duopoly. Thus, the inequality
in (17) may be reversed in some cases.
8It is conﬁrmed that both cases exist. We consider a example with linear demand
P = a−bX, and cost functions Ch = γhwhxh, Cf = τγfwfxf and CJV = γfwhX. Given
a =6 ,τ =1 ,γf =0 .5, γh =2 ,wf = 2 and wh =0 .5, W CD − W JV = −3.72 < 0.
The government then chooses δ∗ = β =0 .34. On the other hand, given a = 18, τ =1 ,
γf =0 .5, γh =2 ,wf = 2 and wh =0 .5, W CD − W JV =7 .85 > 0. The government then
chooses δ∗ ∈ [0,β), where β ≈ 0.4.
64 Conclusion
We have considered the role of foreign equity caps in less developed countries.
Our focus is, in particular, on foreign equity caps for international joint ven-
tures, which few papers examine. Choosing a foreign equity cap level that
maximizes domestic welfare, a host government can aﬀect the market struc-
ture; Cournot duopoly or JV monopoly. We explain the welfare indiﬀerence
property, which implies that world welfare is critical in the determination of
a market structure, even if a government aims to maximize domestic welfare.
The host government is not concerned with ownership share of the domestic
ﬁrm. This result contrasts with that of Katrak (1983). If world welfare un-
der Cournot competition is greater than that under JV monopoly, the host
government sets the foreign equity cap level that prevents international joint
ventures. In contrast, if world welfare under JV monopoly is greater, the
government sets the foreign equity cap level at the threshold ownership level
for foreign ﬁrms and enjoys JV’s production advantage. The latter case is
possible because the JV tends to have a production advantage, i.e., superior
technology and lower wage, and therefore output under monopoly may be
greater than that under duopoly.
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Figure 2: The case of  ) , 0 [
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